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[L. A. No. 27434.

In Bank. June 17, 1965.]

CEJAY PARSONS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRISTOL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et aI., Defendants and
Respondents.
[1] Contracts-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-The interpretation of a written instrument, even though it involves
what might properly be called questions of fact, is essentially
a judicial function tc be exercised according to the generally
accepted ca:::lOns of interpretation so that the purposes of the
instrument may be given effect.
12] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence.-Extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret a written instrument, but not to give it a
meaning to T."hich it is not reasonably susceptible, and it is the
instrument itself that must be given effect.
[S] Contra.ct&-Interpretation-Functions of Courts-Evidence to
Aid Construction.-It is solely a judicial function to interpret
a written instrument unless the interpretation turns on thll
credibility of extrinsic evidence.
[4] Id.-Interpretation-Functions of Courts-Evidence to Aid
Construction.-An appellate court is not bound by a construction of a contract based solely on the terms of the written
instrument with'Out the aid of evidence, where there is no
conflict in the evidence, or a determination has been made on
incompetent evidence. (Disapproving language in Estate of
Rule, 25 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319] to the
·e1fect that an appellate court must accept a trial court's interpretation of a written instrument when "conflicting inferences
lIlay be drawn" from extrinsic evidence, and language invoking
Estate of Rule in E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, 54 Cal.2d
91,94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Faus v. Pacific Electric
Ry. Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 370, 375 [303 P.2d 814]; Overton v.
Vita-Food Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370 [210 P.2d 757]; also
disapproving a similar statement concerning conflicting inferences from uncontroverted evidence in Estate of Jones, 55
Cal.2d 531, 538 [11 Cal.Rptr. 574, 360 P.2d 70).)

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 119; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 240
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 255; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st
ed §l091).
HcX. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 160; [2] Evidence, § 327;
[3-5] Contracts, § 161(9); [6, 11) Architects, § 9; [7) Contracts,
§ 183; [8] Contracts, § 156; [9] Contracts, § 243; [10] Estoppel,
§ 35.
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[6] Id.-Interpretation-Functions of Oourts-Evidence to Aid .
Oonstruction.-Statements that even in the absence of extrinsic
evidence the trial court's interpretation of a written instrument
must be accepted by an appellate court if such construction
is reasonable, or if it is one of two or more reasonable constructions of the instrument, or if it is equally tenable with
the appellate court's interpretation, are proper if they are
interpreted to mean only that an appellate court must determine that the trial court's interpretation is erroneous before
it may properly reverse a judgment; they do not mean that
the appellate court is absolved of its duty to interpret the
instrument.
[6] Architects-Oompensation.-Under a contract for an architect's services containing several subdivisions pertaining to
payment of the architect's fee and providing in one such subdivision that payment would be made only from construction
loan funds, the builder's failure to obtain satisfactory financing
arrangements for the project released it from any obligation
to pay the architect any more than the 25 per cent of his full
fee that he had already received under the contract where the
construction loan condition was not limited to the payment
provision in the contract subdivision in which it appeared but
applied to all subdivisions relating to payment of the architect's fee, since the parties contemplated payment over and
above 25 per cent of the architect's full fee only on commencement of construction and the evidence showed that the architect knew the builder's ability to undertake construction turned
on availability of loan funds.
[7] Oontracts - Interpretation - Oonditions. - When payinent of
money is to be made from a specific fund, and not otherwise,
the failure of such fund will defeat the right of recovery.
[8] Id.-Interpretation-Terms lmplied.-Each party to a contract has a duty to do what the contract presupposes he will
do to accomplish its purpose.
[9] Id.-Breaeh-Prevention of Performance.-A party who prevents fulfillment of a condition of his own obligation under a
contract cannot rely on such eondition to defeat his liability.
[10] Estoppel- Equitable Estoppel- Operation. - In an action
against a builder by an architect to recover the balance of his
fee allegedly due under a contract for his services, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel was not available to the architect so as
to deny the builder the right to invoke a condition of the contract that payment to the architect would be made only from
construction loan funds where, at the time the architect chO!;e
to proceed with his work on the project, the builder did not

[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Architects, § 11; Am.Jur.2d, Architects,
§ 12 et seq.
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represent that construction loan funds had been ()btained and
the architect did not reasonably rely on the existence of such
funds.
.
[11] Architect&-Compensation.-In an action to recover the balance of an architect's fee allegedly due under a contract conditioning payment of such compensation on the obtaining of
construction loan funds by the builder, no breach of the
builder's duty to notify the architect when it became clear
that construction loan funds could not be obtained appeared
where the architect did not show that he failed to receive such
notice, and where, even assuming that he had no notice, he did
not prove the extent to which he suffered damages by continuing to work after he should have received notice.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Samuel Dreizen, Judge. Affirmed.
. Action to recover for services rendered by an architect and
to foreclose a mechanic'8 lien. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Floyd H. Norris as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Felix H. McGinnis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Launer, Chaffee & Hanna, Daniel L. Stack, Miller, Nisson,
Kogler & Wenke and Clark Miller for Defendants and Respondents.
C. Douglas Wikle, Walter Atkinson, W. Alan Thody, Dell
L. Falls, Cooper & Boller, Rowland, Paras & Clowdus and
Gloyd T. Clowdus as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and R.espondents.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In December 1960 defendant Bristol
Development Company entered into a written contract with
plaintiff engaging him as an architect to design an office
building for a lot in Santa Ana and to assist in supervising
construction. Plaintiff's services were to be performed in
two phases. He completed phase one, drafting preliminary
1>lans and specifications, on January 20, 1961, and Bristol
paid him $600.
The dispute concerns Bristol's obligation to pay plaintiff
under phase two of the contract. The contract provided that
"a condition precedent to any duty or obligation on the part
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of the OWNER [Bristol] to commence, continue or complete;l
Phase 2 or to pay ARCHITECT any fee therefor, shall be the
obtaining of economically satisfactory financing arrangements which will enable OWNER, in its sole judgment, to
construct the project at a cost which in the absolute decision I
of the OWNER shall be economically feasible." It further '
provided that when Bristol notified plaintiff to proceed with
phase two it should pay him an estimated 25 per cent of his
fee, and that it would be obligated to pay the remaining 75
per cent "only from construction loan funds."
Using plaintiff's preliminary plans and specifications,
--Bristol obtained from a contractor an estimate of $1,020,850
as the cost of construction, including the architect's fee of
6 per cent. On the basis of this estimate, it received at: offer
from a savings and loan company for a construction loan
upon condition that it show clear title to the Santa Ana lot
aud execute a first trust deed in favor of the loan company.
Shortly after obtaining this offer from the loan company,
Bristol wrote plaintiff on March 14, 1961, to proceed under
phase two of the contract. In accordance with the contract,
Bristol paid plaintiff $12,000,' an estimated 25 per cent of
his total fee. Thereafter, plaintiff began to draft final plans
and specifications for the building.
Bristol, however, was compelled to abandon the project
'because it was unable to show clear title to the Santa Ana
lot and thus meet the requirements for obtaining a construe·.lion loan. Bristol's title became subject to dispute on May
23, 1961, when defendant James Freeman 1iled an action
against Bristol claiming an adverse title. 1 On August 15,
1961, Bristol notified plaintiff to stop work on the project.
. Plaintiff brought an action against Bristol and Freeman
to recover for services performed under the contract and
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on the Santa Ana lot. The trial
court, sitting without a jury, found that Bristol's obligation
to make further payment under the contract was conditioned
upon the existence of construction loan funds. On the ground
that this condition to plaintiff's right to further payment
was not satisfied, the court entered judgment for defendants.
Plaintiff appeals.
The trial court properly admitted evidence extrinsic to
the written instrument to determine the circumstances under
IFreeman had previously conveyed the Santa Ana lot to Bristol on
October 1, 1960, with the understanding that Bristol would construct an
office building upon the lot and pay Freeman an annuity.
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wlJich the parties contracted and the purpose of the contract.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1860; Civ. Code, § 1647; see Corbin, Tke
In'crpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
Cornell L.Q. 161.) There is no con:flict in that evidence.
llristol contends, however, that an appellate court is com)wlled to accept any reasonable interpretation of a written
jUKtrument adopted by a trial court whether or not extrinsic
('vidence has been introduced to interpret the instrument
11IId whether or not that evidence, if any, is in conflict. We
do not agree with this contention.
Since there has been confusion concerning the rules for
~l))pellate review of the interpretation of written instruments
(lice Es~ate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 843,352 [131 P.2d 825] [con(lurring opinion]; Estate of 8hannon, 231 Cal.App.2d 886,
889-890 [42 CalRptr. 278]), it is appropriate here to define
111e scope of such review.
[1] The interpretation of a written instrument, even
though it involves what might properly be called questions
or fact (see Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp.
202.204), is essentially a judicial function to be exercised
according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation
that the purposes of the hlstrument may be given effect. (See
Civ. Code, §§ 1635-1661; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856.1866.)
[S] Extrinsic evidence is "admissible to interpret the in. 6trument, but not to give it a meaning to. which it is not
reasonably susceptible" (Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.
2d 311, 315 [38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265]; Nofziger v.
Il0Zman, 61 Cal.2d 526, 528 [39 Cal.Rptr. 384, 393 P.2d 696];
Imbach v. Schultz, 58 Cal.2d 858, 860 [27 Cal.Rptr. 160,
377 P.2d 272]), and it is the instrument itself 'that must
be given effect. (Civ. Code, §§ 1638, 1639; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1856.) [3] It is therefore solely a judicial function to
interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation
turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. [4] Accordingly, "An appellate court is not bound by a construction of the contract based solely upon the terms of the
written instrument without the aid of evidence [citations],
'where there is no conflict in the evidence [citations], or a
tlctermination has been made upon incompetent evidence
[citation]." (Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d
825]. Accord, Moore v. Wood, 26 Cal.2d 621, 629-630 [160
P.2d 772]; Western Coal &- Mining Co. v. Joncs, 27 Cal.2d
819, 826-827 [167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685]; Estate of
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Wu1iderle, 30 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [181 P.2d 874); Estate of
Fleming, 31 Cal.2d 514, 523 [190 P.2d 611) ; Meyer v. State
Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 381 [267 P.2d 257).)1
[6] It is true that cases have said that even in the absence
of extrinsic evidence the trial court's interpretation of a
written instrument must be accepted "if such interpretation
is reasonable, or if [it) is one of two or more reasonable constructions of the instrument" (Priekett v. Royal Ins. Co.,
56 Cal.2d 234, 237 [14 Cal.Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907, 86 A.L.R.
2d 711) ; Lundin v. Hallmark Productions, Inc. 161 Cal.App.
2d 698, 701 [327 P.2d 166), or if it is "equally tenable" with
the appellate court's interpretation (Estate of Northcutt, 16
Ca1.2d 683, 690 [107 P.2d 607); accord, Estate of Cuneo,
60 Cal.2d 196, 201 [32 Cal.Rptr. 409, 384 P.2d 1]). Such
statements are not in conflict with Estate of Platt, supra, 21
Ca1.2d 343, if they are interpreted, as they should be, to mean
only that an appellate court must determine that the trial
court's interpretation is erroneous before it may properly
reverse a judgment. (See Estate of Shannon, 231 Cal.App.
2d 886, 893 [42 Cal.Rptr. 278).) They do not mean that
the appellate court is absolved of its duty to interpret the
instrument.
Since there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence in the
present case we must make an independent determination
of the meaning of the contract . .After providing for payment
of an estimated 25 per cent of plaintiff's fee upon written
notice to proceed with phase two, paragraph 4 of the contract
makes the following provisions for payment:
SWe disapprove lanpage in Estate of Bule, 25 Cal.2d 1,11 [152 P.lld
1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319J, to the effect that an appellate court must aeeept
a trial court's interpretation of a written instrument when " con:6.ieting
inferences may be drawn" from extrinsic evidence. The rule of Estate of
Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825), and the eases applying it make
it clear that it is only when eon:6.icting inferences arise from eon:6.icting
evidence, not from uncontroverted evidence, that the trial court's resolution is binding. "The very possibility of ... conflicting inferences, actu·
ally con:flicting interpretations, far from relieving the appellate court of
the responsibility of interpretation, signalizes the necessity of its assuming that responsibility." (Estate of Bule, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 17 [dissenting opinion].) Language in E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, 64
Cal.2d 91, 94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Faus v. Pacific Eleotric
By. Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 370, 375 [303 P.2d 814]; Overicm v. Vita-Food
Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370 [210 P.2d 757], invoking Estate Of Bule,
is likewise disapproved. A similar statement eoncernmg con:6.icting inferences from uncontroverted evidence in EBtate of Jones, 55 Cal.2d 531, 638
[11 Cal.Rptr. 574, 360 P.2d 70], is also disapproved. The eases cited in
support of such a rule by tlle Jcmes ease did not involve the interpretation of written instruments.
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"(a) ...•
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'.' (b) Upon completion of final working plans, specifications and engineering, or authorized commencement of construction, whichever is later, a sum equal to SEVENTY-FIVE
(75%) PER CENT of the fee for services in Phase 2, less all
previous payments made on account of fee; provided, however, that this payment shall be made only from construction
loan funds.
"(c) The balance of the fee shall be paid in equal monthly
.payments commencing with the first day of the month following payments as set forth in Paragraph 4(b); provided,
however, that TEN (10%) PER CENT of the fee based upon
the reasonable estimated cost of construction shall be withheld until thirty (30) days after the Notice of Completion
of the project has been filed.
"(d) If any work designed or specified by the ARCHITECT
is abandoned of [sic] suspended in whole or in part, the
ARcmTECT is to be paid forthwith to the extent that his services have been rendered under the preceding terms of this
paragraph. Should such abandonment or suspension occur
before the ARcHITECT has completed any particular phase of
the work which entitles him to a partial paymcnt as aforesaid, the ARcHITECT'S fee shall be prorated based upon the
percentage of the work completed under that particular
phase and shall be payable forthwith."
[8] Invoking the provision that "payment shall be made
only from construction loan funds," Bristol contends that
since such funds were not obtained it is obligated to pay
plaintiff no more than he has already received under the
contract.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he performed
95 per cent of his work on phase two and is entitled to that
portion of his fee under subdivision (d) of paragraph 4 less
the previous payment he received. He contends that subdivision Cd) is a "savings clause" designed to secure partial
payment if, for any reason, including the lack of funds, the
project was abandoned or suspended. Plaintiff would limit
the construction loan condition to subdivision (b), for it
provides "that this payment shall be made only from construction loan funds" (emphasis added), whereas the other
subdivisions are not expressly so conditioned.
The construction loan condition, however, cannot reasonably be limited to subdh'ision (b), for subdivisions (c) anrl
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(d) both refer to the terms of subdivision (b) and must
fore be interpreted with reference to those terms. Thus,
"balance of the fee" payable "in equal monthly
under subdivision (c) necessarily refers to the
subdivisions of paragraph 4. 8 In the absence of
to the contrary, subdivision (d), upon which plaintiff relieS,.
must likewise be interpreted to incorporate the construction
loan condition (Civ. Code, § 1641), for it makes explicii
reference to payment under preceding subdivisions by languagc such as "under the preceding terms" and "partial
payment as aforesaid." Subdivision (d) merely provides ___ """".
accelerated payment upon the happening of a
It contemplates, however, that construction shall have
for it provides for prorated payment upon the abando:wxleIllt.
or suspension in whole or in part of "any work
or specified by the Architect." Implicit in the scheme is
purpose to provide, after initial payments, for a series of
ments from construction loan funds, with accelerated na.vn~ell1:
from such funds in the event that construction was au,a.Ll'""V.LI"''''
or suspended. Although plaintiff was guaranteed an ",,, •..u.ua,,,,,,,,,
25 per cent of his fee if the project was frustrated
construction, further payment was contemplated only
the commencement of construction. This int.PTTll',pt.A.t.in,n
supported by evidence that plaintiff knew that Bristol's
to undertake construction turned upon the availability of
funds. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined
that payments beyond an estimated 25 per cent of plainti1f~.
fee for phase two were to be made only from
loan funds.
[7] When "payment of money is to be made from a
cific fund, and not otherwise, the failure of such fund
defeat the right of recovery." (Rains v. Arnett, 189
App.2d 337, 347 [11 Cal.Rptr. 299].) Although there are, '.
exceptions to this rule, plaintiff has neither alleged no~·.
proved facts that entitle him to reCQver on the ground of anJ';:
exception.
.
[8] Each party to a contract has a duty to do what the
contract presupposes he will do to accomplish its purpose.
(Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Ca1.2d 92, 99 [156 P.2d 757, 157
A.L.R. 1277].) [9] Thus, "A party who prevents ful-' \
fillment of a condition of his own obligation ... cannot rely
3,Althougll neither the amount of each monthly payment nor the nun.tber"
of payments was specified, the amount and number could be determmcd
from the time estimated to construct the building.
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on such condition to defeat his liability." (Bewick v. Mecham,
supra, 26 Ca1.2d at p. 99; Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey,
15 Cal.2d 711, 717 [104 P.2d 641].) Plaintiff, however, has
not shown that Bristol failed to make the proper and reasonable efforts that were contemplated to secure the loan from
which he was to be paid. (Cf. Rosenheim v. Howze, 179 Cal.
309 [176 P. 456].) The risk that a loan might not be ob" mined even though Bristol acted properly and in good faith
~""was a risk clearly anticipated even though the reason the
loan failed may not have been foreseen.
[10] Nor has plaintiff established grounds for applying
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny Bristol the right
to invoke the construction loan condition. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 1962, subd. 3.) If, by its letter of March 14, asking
plaintiff to proceed with his work under phase two of the
eontract, Bristol had induced plaintiff to believe that funds
had been obtained, and if plaintiff had reasonably relied
upon such representation, Bristol could not invoke the condition to defeat its contractual liability. Reasonable reliance
resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position is
the essence of equitable estoppel, and therefore a compelling
basis for preventing a party from invoking a condition that
he represented as being satisfied. (See Crestline Mobile Homes
Mfg. Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp., 54 Ca1.2d 773, 778-781
[8 Cal.Rptr. 448, 356 P.2d 192] ; cf. Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 414-415 [333 P.2d 757].) Bristol, however, did not represent that funds had been obtained, and
plaintiff did not reasonably rely upon the existence of construction loan funds when he undertook work under phase
two of the contract. A representative of Bristol told plaintiff
before he began phase two of his work that although Bristol
would be able to pay plaintiff $12,000, an estimated 25 per
cent of his fee, "they would not be able to proceed unless
actual construction funds were obtained." Plaintiff, knowing that funds had not been obtained, nevertheless chose
to proceed with his work on the project.
[11] Finally, plaintiff has not shown that Bristol breached
the duty to give him notice when it became clear that construction funds could not be obtained. Without such funds
the purpose of the contract would have been frustrated and
plaintiff could not have been paid the balance of his fee.
Plaintiff therefore would have been excused from performing
80 long as there was a reasonable doubt as to his compensation. Whether or not such funds were obtained was a matter
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peculiarly within Bristol's knowledge. Accordingly,
had a duty to notifY plaintiff that the project was 'imlra..",ilAit
when Freeman filed his action against Bristol on May
for Bristol then knew or should have known that it
be unable to obtain a loan. Plaintiff, however, has not
that he failed to receive such notice, and even if it is 8Sl!IUDled
that he had no notice, he did not prove the extent to which he·
suffered damages by continuing to work after he should bve
received notice.
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mask,·
and Burke, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July
1965.
[Crim. Nos. 7610,7615,7616,7617. In Bank. June 17,

.THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRED
CLARK, LEROY COULVERSON, JR., and
DAVIS, Defendants and Appellants.
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11] Oriminal Law-Probation-Revocation of Order and 'I!!.. ~.....-.:.
ment of Jndgment.-Where defendant's probation on a
glary charge was revoked and sentence imposed to run
currently with that imposed for his conviction of muraer,
dismissal of the murder charge, the proceedings for im]positiCiln
of sentence of burglary sh'Ould be remanded for im:po!litj,oD;
of corrected sentence and rendition of judgment.
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Appea1-:&eversible Erlror--EIVid.en(:e---OonfetlBiI)ns,.~J.
It was prejudicial error to introduce defendants' sta.teD~ents.:li
obtained while they were under arrest, by interrogations de- ..
signed to elicit incriminating statements, without informing .
them of their rights to. counsel and to remain silent, which
were not effectively waived, where the statements were the .
only evidence presented by the People to connect defendants
with the crime charged, and where their later testimony containing both eXCUlpatory and incriminating inferen.ces was
Melt. Dig. References: [lJ Criminal Law, §995; [2,3J Criminal "
Law, § 1382(27); [4,5J Criminal Law, § 222; [6-8] Criminal Law, ,
§ 234(1); [9J Criminal Law, § 251; [10J Criminal Law, § 233; .'
[11] Criminal Law, §§ 234, 250; [12J Criminal Law, §§ 234, 252;
[13J Criminal Law, § 252(2); [14] Criminal Law, § 245; [16]
Homicide, § 188; [16] Homicide, § 16(6); [17] Criminal Law,
1101ll

